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Why does the European Commission at times propose legislative drafts that provoke Member State
opposition, that introduce strikingly high or low standards, or that actively contradict each other?
Miriam Hartlapp, Julia Metz and Christian Rauh present ﬁndings from a study of 48 legislative
drafting processes. They argue that while the Commission is often thought of as a uniﬁed actor,
there is substantial disagreement within the Commission over the nature of legislative proposals.
They write that studying this conﬂict is key to understanding the policies the institution proposes for
Europe.
The European Commission is at the core of the European Union’s political system and its quasi-
monopoly on the initiation of legislation provides signiﬁcant leverage over EU policy. Within its ﬁve-
year terms, each Commission proposes up to 2,000 binding legal acts and thus crucially shapes the
rules that govern the daily lives of more than 500 million European citizens.
Despite this centrality in EU governance, little is known about its internal position formation
processes and inconsistent pictures of Commission agency dominate public and academic debates.
The Commission, seen as a monolithic actor, is depicted as being either a technocratic body that
adopts policies it deems to be eﬃcient and eﬀective problem solutions or an inherently political
bureaucracy that constantly seeks to increase its competences vis-à-vis national governments.
These perspectives do not explain why Commission proposals sometimes give rise to formidable
opposition from the member states and other stakeholders, such as those on the European
Research Council. They also fail to explain why the Commission sometimes introduces strikingly
high or strikingly low standards on closely related issues, as in the case of consumer policy, or even
introduces proposals that actively contradict each
other in substance, as occurred with the posting of
workers and liberalisation of services directive.
Our book Which Policy for Europe? Power and
Conﬂict inside the European Commission takes issue
with monolithic conceptions of the Commission and
challenges the unitary actor assumption. Chieﬂy, we
assess how the policy position of an individual
Directorate-General inside the Commission is formed
with regard to a speciﬁc legislative proposal and how
we can explain a Directorate-General’s policy
choices. In addition we also analyse how deviating
internal positions are coordinated and how we can
explain the assertiveness of a Directorate-General in
inﬂuencing the ﬁnal Commission proposal’s
substance.
Frequent internal conﬂict
We have analysed 48 legislative drafting processes that fall into the intersection of social and common market
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policies, research and innovation policies, and consumer policy adopted during the Prodi and Barrosso I
Commissions (1999-2009). For each legal act, we reconstruct the complete position formation process inside the
Commission, mainly relying on ﬁrst-hand insights drawn from 150 structured interviews with Commission oﬃcials
who had direct involvement. We ﬁnd that while the outside view usually presents consensual decision-making in the
College of Commissioners – obviously this makes sense to strengthen the Commission’s position vis-à-vis the
Council and Parliament – the inside view on the process of position formation tells quite a diﬀerent story.
First, far-reaching policy choices are often taken at the Commission’s administrative level, rather than at the political
level of the College of Commissioners. Second, inside the Commission intense interactions and substantial conﬂict
are the norm rather than the exception. This makes position formation a time-consuming process (on average 25.6
months) and oﬀers multiple entrance points for external interests, such as member states, organised interests, or
experts, as well as for other aﬀected services.
In fact, in more than three quarters of the analysed cases we found substantially deviating positions between
diﬀerent administrative units inside the Commission. Typically, three to four Directorates-General disagreed and did
so across rather stable conﬂict lines, as the Figure below shows. For example, legislation in the area of social and
internal market policies often evoked conﬂict between the Directorates-General for Employment (EMPL), for the
Internal Market (MARKT), and for Enterprise and Industry (ENTR).
Figure: Conﬂict within the Commission by policy areas (click to enlarge)
Note: The three charts indicate the degree of conﬂict between Commission Directorates- 2/5
Note: The three charts indicate the degree of conﬂict between Commission Directorates-
General in three policy areas. The vertical axis indicates the frequency with which a
particular Directorate-General was the lead actor on legislation within the policy area (the
higher the number the more active they were). The horizontal axis indicates how frequently
each Directorate-General took a ‘deviant position’ (i.e. a position which deviated from the
ideal position of the lead actor). Directorates-General which appear on the right of a chart
have accordingly challenged the formally responsible department more often in the
respective policy area. For a full list of the Directorates-General and their abbreviations see
here.
Three ideal types of position formation
In essence, the policy substance of a Commission proposal depends on which Directorates-General and/or
Commissioners were involved and who proved to be most powerful. Consequently, interaction inside the
Commission needs to feature much more prominently in our explanations of the policies proposed for Europe.
With this stated, what are the diﬀerent substantial positions, conﬂict lines and power resources inside the
Commission? We have analysed these at length, with the general conclusion being that the Commission neither
follows member state interests nor focuses on eﬀective problem solutions all of the time. Rather, diﬀerent types of
agency constantly co-exist inside the Commission. These can be summarised into three ideal-typical process
patterns.
First, in a technocratic position formation process, the internal Commission actor’s most important goal is ﬁnding the
optimal policy solution. Expertise is the bureaucrat’s most relevant source of inﬂuence. For example, the extant
acquis and ECJ jurisprudence are important sources of legal consistency and external views are welcomed if they
oﬀer eﬃcient solutions or templates. However, as sectoral policy-portfolios might diﬀer in their preferred problem
solutions, interaction between Commission services may emerge, which then resembles a coordination game where
all actors expect common spoils and adjust their positions on the basis of argumentative processes.
Second, this view contrasts with Commission actors who enter position formation with the goal of retaining or
expanding their competences and/or budget vis-à-vis the national level or in turf wars with other Commission
services. Positions are often best explained by the anticipation of future decision-making in view of aggregate
national interests. Stakeholders and interests are granted inﬂuence where they deliver support and are deemed
necessary to safeguard competence extension. Diﬀering sharply from technocratic processes, interaction resembles
a zero-sum game where one Directorate-General ‘wins’ and another ‘loses’, with Directorates-General exploiting all
available resources strategically to this end.
Finally, processes are equally political under the policy-seeking type. The diﬀerence here is that actors enter the
process with ideological goals and use their oﬃces to accomplish them. Policy positions and internal assertiveness
result from a pursuit of a normative ﬁt between actor ideologies and the contents of the legislative proposal. This
means that stakeholder access follows a so called ‘neo-pluralist’ pattern and that a Directorate-General may mostly
care about those member states with an ideologically congruent policy. Conﬂict is typically overcome by building
external and internal alliances held together by the allies’ beliefs and views: for example along close party-political
stances among Commissioners or among like-minded services.
Speciﬁc processes might share diﬀerent ideal typical features or might switch from one type to the other in one
process. In explaining what mediates between the diﬀerent process-types, we ﬁnd that policy context matters: High
uncertainty about policy consequences suppresses internal competence-seeking but does not necessarily lead to
more technocratic decision-making. On the contrary, uncertainty sometimes made internal actors rely on normative
heuristics, thus resulting in policy-seeking processes. A high public salience of the regulated issues, in turn, made
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both competence-seeking and ideological considerations more relevant. In light of rising public attention on
European decisions, we thus expect an increasing potential for more political processes in the future.
Which policy for Europe?
If diﬀerent process types exist, there are also diﬀerent leverage points for inﬂuencing policy substance. To illustrate
the argument, consider the question whether internal position formation contributes to explaining the frequently
asserted predominance of market-liberal positions over more interventionist approaches in European legislation.
Under the technocratic model, more interventionism can be expected from unbiased expertise, such as from
balanced access to the Commission’s expert groups or the creation of more interventionist legal precedents.
Under the competence-seeking model, Commission positions on the market-interventionism dimension may be
based on the extent of competence transfers they generate. Thus, restructuring the internal distribution of
responsibilities could stimulate departure from the extant acquis. Moreover, reducing the power resources of the
lead department could also ensure more balanced EU policies.
Under the policy-seeking model, ﬁnally, those aiming at more balanced (in the sense of less liberal) market
regulation should mainly focus on the selection of the Commission’s leading personnel and its ideological
orientation. This holds particularly for the Commission President who – via the Commission’s Secretariat General –
controls the balancing of coordination processes and the assignment of lead departments. Combined with our
insight that a policy-seeking Commission is indeed responsive to the public, open political competition for the leading
positions in the Commission could thus be a key lever under the policy-seeking model.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
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